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SESSION FOUR
COMMENTS ON PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SYMPOSIUM
ON AIR TRANSPORT LABOR RELATIONS
By

T

BENJAMIN AARONt

HE PAPERS presented at this symposium were generally of high

quality; moreover, they collectively provide more up-to-date and
comprehensive information about the impact of the Railway Labor Act
on the air transport industry than has yet been conveniently available. I
regret that time does not permit me to give to each of the contributions
the attention it deserves; but my function, as I understand it, is simply to
recapitulate the major themes of the symposium and to add a few comments on the principal issues.
With varying degrees of intensity, the speakers have expressed dissatisfaction with the application of the Railway Labor Act to airlines in
respect of a broad spectrum of situations: The determination of "craft
or class," the investigation of representation disputes, the conduct of elections, the mediation of both "major" and "minor" disputes, the "major""minor" dichotomy itself, the handling of so-called emergency disputes
under section 10 of the Act and the functioning of system boards of
adjustment.
Suggested remedial measures have ranged from modest proposals for more
research into existing practices to bold recommendations for a complete
reorganization of labor law administration, including the creation of a
labor court. In addition, labor and management have been exhorted to
collaborate in the development of mutually acceptable alternatives to
strikes in the air transport industry, thus averting the dire consequences
to themselves of hasty and intemperate action by an aroused Congress.
Despite these various criticisms, some of them quite forceful, none of
the participants in the symposium has called for the outright repeal of the
Railway Labor Act. Several of them-notably Professor Morris and Mr.
Uelmen-marched up the hill; but ultimately they both marched down
again, although by different routes. My own view, repeatedly stated for
some time past,1 is that the Railway Labor Act has outlived its usefulness
and should be repealed. I have never proposed, however, and do not now
advocate such repeal except in connection with a comprehensive review
and revision of the entire body of our federal laws affecting labor-managet Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los
Angeles.
'See e.g., my paper, The Airlines and the Railway Labor Act, presented at the 1966 Connecticut
General Flight Forum.
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ment relations. Obviously, an enterprise of that magnitude requires both
a favorable political and economic climate and a great deal of careful planning. That it is not likely to be launched in the near future is no reason,
however, why the idea should not be seriously considered and continuously
refined.
At the same time, the more easily achievable objective of removing the
air transport industry from coverage of the Railway Labor Act should,
I think, be actively pursued. The papers presented at this Symposium indicate, as I have said, a general dissatisfaction with the present situation.
At best, the industry's experience under the Act to date invites comparison
with Dr. Samuel Johnson's observation about a dog walking on his hind
legs: "It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."
Some, like Mr. Heisler, apparently believe that the Act can be made to
work if the National Mediation Board will revise its policies in respect of
such vital matters as the determination of appropriate bargaining units,
but, with all respect, I do not find such arguments very persuasive. Mere
patchwork is not enough; more fundamental corrections are required.
In the light of political realities, however, the prospects for removal of
the air transport industry from under the Railway Labor Act do not appear
very promising. Therefore, even though patchwork of the present system
of policies and practices is an essentially inadequate alternative, we should
make every effort to use it with maximum effectiveness.
Let us consider, first, the determination of "craft and class" and representation elections. I link these two topics together not only because of
their close functional relationship, but also because the papers by Messrs.
Harlan, Heisler, Uelmen, and Goulard suggest the existence of substantial
agreement on a number of important points. To put the matter the other
way, I detected no real opposition against two propositions: First, that
employers should be made parties, as a matter of right, in unit determination proceedings; and second, that election ballots should provide a place
for a "No" vote. In respect of the latter point it is true, of course, that
under the Mediation Board's present practice, an employee who carefully
reads the ballot instructions will know that if he writes in the blank
space provided for that purpose the name of a union other than the one
or more whose names appear on the ballot, or if he deliberately voids his
ballot or simply fails to vote, he will, in effect, have cast a "No" vote. This
procedure, as we know, is perfectly legal; indeed, under section 2, Ninth
of the Act the Mediation Board is not required to determine the wishes of
the employees regarding a bargaining representative by secret ballot, but
may use "any other appropriate method." No participant in this symposium, however, has defended the present complicated and difficult procedure for exercising a negative choice.
The informal discussion of several of the papers reflected some very
sharp criticisms over the. manner in which the Mediation Board has determined bargaining units and conducted elections. I can think of no
statutory changes, however drastic, that will eliminate that kind of pro-
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test. It does seem to me, though, that unit determination questions are
likely to be decided more wisely and fairly by the Board if employers are
made parties to the proceedings, and that charges of unfair tactics in representation elections, especially those made by rival labor organizations, would
be less likely to arise if the NMB were to adapt its election rules more
closely to those developed by the National Labor Relations Board.
Let us turn, next, to the grievance and adjustment board procedures in
the air transport industry. If I correctly understand Messrs. Kahn,
Schwartz, and Hill, they have, after some preliminary exploration, abandoned the attempt to develop a "model" system board procedure. That is
good news indeed; for in my opinion they were pursuing a mirage. The
idea of a model grievance and arbitration procedure is not new; it was
more or less seriously discussed at least as early as World War II, but has
been gradually discarded as our experience and sophistication in collective
bargaining have increased. Grievance and arbitration procedures must be
custom-made and tailored precisely to fit the peculiar needs of the parties.
The papers on this subject all indicate an understandable and entirely
justifiable concern about needless steps in grievance procedures and other
avoidable causes of delay. Although I fully share their concern about delay,
which I consider to be one of the most important defects in the settlement
of grievances under both the Railway Labor and Taft-Hartley Acts, I do
not attach as much importance as some others do to such things as the
elimination of transcripts, briefs, or written opinions. The great breakthrough, it seems to me, must take the form of speedier and much more
frequent settlements in the steps of the grievance procedure preceding the
stage of third-party intervention.
I have perhaps a somewhat greater concern than has generally been
expressed at this symposium about the rights of individual employees who
either are not members of labor organizations representing them in collective bargaining or are members at odds with the leadership of those
organizations. My views on this subject are set forth in some detail in a
recent article,' and I shall therefore merely summarize them here. In
brief, I think that the rights of individual employees, both dissident union
members and nonunion members of the bargaining unit, are insufficiently
protected by either the Railway Labor Act or the Taft-Hartley Act. The
complete imperium which employers and unions jointly exert over grievance and arbitration procedures, the strong presumption of a union's
reasonableness and good faith usually assumed by the courts, and the
judicially imposed requirement of exhaustion of contract and administrative remedies as a condition precedent to bringing an action in court for
breach of a collective agreement all combine to place the individual employee almost completely under the control of his bargaining representative. This seems to me particularly unfortunate in the case of a discharged
employee who has no wish to be reinstated and merely seeks damages for
an alleged violation of his rights under a collective agreement. Although I
.

2

Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and National

Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 167 (1968).
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did not at first, I now agree with Mr. Justice Black that the Supreme Court's
decision in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddoxk was wrong.
On the general subject of judicial review of airline system board awards
we have Professor Kroner's interesting paper, which deals primarily with
two issues: First the standards of judicial review applicable to system board
awards when the jurisdiction of such boards is limited by contract language
to a narrower scope than that specified in the Railway Labor Act; and
second, the procedural and substantive problems inherent in the resolution
of work-assignment disputes under the Act.
In respect of the first of these issues Professor Kroner has raised some
questions which, as he says, go to the heart of the matter of judicial review. He rightly points out that, depending upon how strictly the courts
apply the principle that arbitrators must draw "the essence" of their
awards from the collective agreements involved, the way may be open
for judicial review of substance in the guise of determining whether system boards have exceeded their jurisdiction. He also mentions the chilling
possibility that disputes which would normally be considered "minor," but
which have been placed outside the system board's jurisdiction by the
language of the collective agreement, as construed by the courts, might
then be considered to be "major" disputes or, perhaps, be consigned to a
limbo outside of both categories.
In respect of the issue of work-assignment disputes Professor Kroner
has convincingly demonstrated, at least to me, that the basic difficulties
involved in both intra- and interdivisional jurisdictional conflicts between
unions are not resolved by Justice Black's abstract formula enunciated in
the Transportation-Communicationcase. I shall not attempt further to
summarize Professor Kroner's discussion of this point; what he shows is
that although resolution of these types of disputes in a single proceeding
binding upon all interested parties is a consummation devoutly to be
wished, the Supreme Court's formula in the Transportation-Communication
case will almost certainly not bring about that happy result.
The procedural and substantive problems involved in the resolution of
multiparty work-assignment disputes serve to remind us once again that
our cherished distinction between disputes over rights and disputes over
interests may not be as perfect or as indispensable as we have always
assumed. The British observe no such distinction in arbitration; for a
number of reasons which I cannot go into here, they treat each labor dispute as a problem to be solved, without worrying whether the claim is
founded on rights or interests. The industrial relations system in Britain

has serious defects; but the swelling chorus of criticism of that system is
often ill-informed, exaggerated, and misdirected. The British long ago
perceived a fundamental truth which we simply refuse to recognize,
namely, that the tidy distinction between and separate treatment of disputes over rights and those over interests does not automatically or invariably insure the viable solution to all labor-management disputes.
3379 U.S. 650

(1965).
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As time goes on, I think we shall have increasingly to ignore that distinction in our grievance and arbitration procedures when dealing with
particularily intractable types of controversies, of which the interdivisional
work-assignment dispute is the paradigm. Meanwhile, the air transport
industry should, in its own enlightened self interest, speedily adopt the
eminently sensible suggestion of Professors Kroner and Kahn and others,
and undertake a comprehensive review of the relative effectiveness of its
various system board procedures.
The distinction under the Railway Labor Act between "major" and
,minor" disputes (which, incidentally, should in my judgment be commemorated in the railroad and air transport industries by an annual day
of mourning) is adverted to also in the papers by Messrs. Schwartz and
Hill and deserves some further notice. Some years ago I advanced the thesis
that the changing character of disputes arising under the Act was tending
to destroy whatever useful purpose had once been served by distinguishing
between "major" and "minor" disputes.4 In Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley
Mr. Justice Rutledge described "minor" disputes as those involving "the
smaller differences which inevitably appear in the carrying out of major
agreements" and which "seldom produce strikes." The most serious disputes
arising under the Act today, however, involve issues such as work rules and
the size and composition of crews, which are more likely to be denominated
"tmajor" or "minor" on the basis of the bargaining tactics of the parties
than on the substance of the controversy.
Moreover, the consequences of classifying a dispute in one or the other
of these categories can, as Messrs. Schwartz and Hill point out, be of crucial
importance to the parties. If the dispute is held to be "minor," the union
may not strike and will be compelled by injunction, if necessary, to maintain the status quo. Mr. Schwartz argues that unless the employer is
similarly enjoined, which is usually not the case, the employees must continue to work for indefinite and often lengthy periods under changed
conditions which they regard as oppressive and unfair. Mr. Hill replies
that the foregoing argument is based on several "fallacies," including the
belief that the steps an employer must take to manage his business should
be equated with a union's resort to self-help. Contrary to Mr. Schwartz,
he opposes court orders requiring employers to maintain the status quo in
"minor" disputes.
My own views on this particular issue are already on record. Requiring
an employer to maintain the status quo as a condition to the granting of
an antistrike injunction in a "minor" dispute will not, in my opinion,
necessarily balance what the Supreme Court has termed "competing claims
of irreparable hardship";' it may in fact simply shift the hardship from
the union to the employer. The former can count on some retroactive relief, however inadequate, if it wins a favorable award from a system board
of adjustment; the latter, even though it should win, will not be compen'The Labor Injunctions Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 292, 320-21 (1963).
5325 U.S. 711, 724 (1945).
'Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 535 (1960).
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sated for the delay in introducing the charges that prompted the dispute.
If those charges happened to be operating economies, a lengthy postponement might prove fatal to the enterprise. Moreover, the balancing of "competing claims of irreparable hardship" is the kind of policy determination
which Congress made clear it wanted to reserve to itself by enacting the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Of course, as Mr. Hill points out, speedy adjudication of "minor" disputes is much more feasible in the air transport industry than in the railroad industry, because the former relies entirely on system boards of adjustment and is not afflicted with a grievance-embalming institution comparable to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Prompt disposition of
"minor" disputes would prevent either party from being unduly prejudiced by judicial orders to maintain the status quo.
Finally, we have the papers on proposed changes in legislation affecting
airlines. ' Mr. Weiss' paper surveys the current crop of bills; collectively,
they show that labor court proposals are very much in style. Mr. Weiss
effectively exposes the inanity and potential danger of the better known
of these bills, and any further comment would endow them with an importance they do not deserve.
Having spent the better part of the last three years studying the operation of labor courts in several European countries, however, I cannot refrain from making a few observations on the general subject. It seems to
me most regrettable that we in this country are so consistently indifferent
to foreign experience in dealing with problems of common concern. Although it is apparent, for a number of reasons, that none of the several
models of European labor courts could be introduced intact into the
United States, we could learn much from studying them. Time does not
permit a discussion of this point in detail, but I should like to draw attention to the tripartite structure of the German and Swedish labor courts and
the essentially bipartite structure of the French labor courts. This feature,
when combined with the conciliation functions built into the procedures
of the French and German labor courts, and to a lesser extent into the
Swedish labor court, suggests a whole range of possible experiments we
might introduce into our present system of administrative and judicial
handling of labor-management disputes.
The paper giving rise to the greatest amount of controversy in this symposium is undoubtedly that of Mr. Wisehart, which elaborates on his
recent article, "Transportation Strike Control Legislation: A Congressional
Challenge." 8 In brief, Mr. Wisehart proposes that emergency boards established under section 10 of the Railway Labor Act should be given "the
responsibility for determining whether a dispute-or any part of itshould be submitted to arbitration. . . ."' He thinks the two controlling
criteria in arriving at this decision should be the emergency board's estiI regret that I did not receive a copy of Mr. Curtin's paper and that he did not have time
to summarize it orally during the symposium.
8 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1697 (1968).
9

1d. at 1719.
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mate of the effect of the threatened strike on the public and its judgment
of the likelihood that the parties will settle the dispute by collective bargaining.
Although I have some questions concerning some of the reasons that
have led Mr. Wisehart to his ultimate proposal, I shall, because of limitations of time, confine my comments to the latter. Most of the discussion
of his paper by other participants in the symposium reflected hostility to
compulsory arbitration itself; consequently, his proposal as to how and
when it should be invoked received relatively less attention. My own reaction is somewhat different: I do not regard compulsory arbitration as the
ultimate abomination; I am even willing seriously to consider the hypothesis that it is the best way to deal with certain types of disputes.
Nevertheless, I am troubled by Mr. Wisehart's proposal to vest in the
emergency boards the final decision whether to invoke the procedure.
Mr. Wisehart was most generous in his tribute to the competence and
dedication of those who serve on emergency boards; but as one who has had
his share of that experience, I react to his praise with the same embarrassment and uneasiness that I felt when reading Mr. Justice Douglas' effusive
and somewhat inaccurate comments in the Steelworkers Trilogy about the
wisdom and expertise of arbitrators. I would not rule out the possibility of
using compulsory arbitration in some cases, but if it is to be used, the
final decision, in my opinion, should rest with Congress. Only in that
way can we prevent too ready resort to a highly specialized tool of such
limited utility.
I go along with Mr. Wisehart to the extent of believing that emergency
boards should have the right, and perhaps the duty, to recommend procedures, as distinguished from substantive proposals, to resolve disputes
that apparently cannot be settled by mediation. In my opinion, however,
such recommendations should go first to the President, and should be
referred by him to Congress, together with his own recommendations, if
any. Presumably, Congress would not be insensitive to emergency board
recommendations, particularly those endorsed by the President. But only
in Congress can there be a full and public airing of arguments for and
against the use of compulsory arbitration in a given case. To be sure, the
circumstances may be urgent, and Congress may be forced to legislate in
haste and, possibly, in anger. If so, that is one of the incalculable risks the
parties must assume as a consequence of their unwillingness or inability to
settle their dispute.
It is impossible here to do justice to Professor Morris' proposal for the
creation of a constitutional "United States Labor Court." For one thing,
as I understand it, the court would have jurisdiction over the substantive
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959; thus the proposal encompasses many more topics than were covered by this symposium.
A more immediate and practical difficulty is that I have not seen the full
text of his paper, and the portion that I have read does not deal in any
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detail with the application of his proposal to the Railway Labor Act, or,
more specifically, to the air transport industry. Without endorsing the
details of his proposal, which I would want to review when the entire
paper is published, I should like, nevertheless, to applaud his general approach, which seems to be the closest among all those presented at this
symposium to my idea of a comprehensive revision of all of our labor laws.
In conclusion, I should like to compliment Mr. Highsaw for his scholarly
and lucid discussion of the experience of the air transport industry under
the Railway Labor Act. Reasonable men can and do differ as to the extent
of required administrative or legislative changes in the existing system,
but all will benefit from informed and relatively dispassionate analysis of
things as they are.

